TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/091790/0917006.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 7KB | 142 lines

                `I                                                          WORLD, Page 59

CAMBODIA

Hurdles to Peace


Hopes for a settlement may be on the rise, but the war will end
once and for all only if at least six tricky issues can be
resolved

By STANLEY W. CLOUD -- With reporting by William Stewart/Hong
Kong


    After a week-long diplomatic gavotte over protocol,
representatives of the four factions in Cambodia's civil war
were all present in Jakarta last weekend. On hand were Prime
Minister Hun Sen and leaders of two of the three guerrilla
armies fighting to overthrow him: Son Sann and Khieu Samphan
of the infamous Khmer Rouge. The third, Prince Norodom
Sihanouk, pleaded a last-minute illness and sent a stand-in.

    The gathering was to consider a maddeningly complex peace
proposal put forth last month by the five permanent members of
the U.N. Security Council that requires approval by all the
Cambodian "parties" before it can go into effect. The main item
on the Jakarta agenda was the plan's call for creation of a
Supreme National Council intended to symbolize Cambodian
nationhood during a long transition to peace.

    To some, the prospects for ending the war seem brighter than
they have in a long time. Not only were the Cambodian parties
due to begin talking again in Jakarta, but Secretary of State
James Baker disclosed that the U.S. had agreed to engage in
direct diplomatic contact with representatives of the Hun Sen
government. Still, many observers remain pessimistic. "An
international agreement on Cambodia does not equal an internal
agreement," said Shafiq Fit Abdullah of the Institute of
Strategic International Affairs in Kuala Lumpur. To get that,
at least six steps -- each problematic at best -- must be taken
before the U.N. plan can succeed:

    1. A Supreme National Council must be created. The body
would have only an advisory role, but Hun Sen argues, not
unreasonably, that the tripartite rebel coalition should have
one vote instead of the three it seeks. It is by no means
certain that the current peace offensive will pass even this
initial hurdle.

    2. All parties must accept a so-called interim U.N.-run
administration, pending elections for a new government. The
rebel factions have indicated their support for this, and small
wonder. The proposal would achieve their main goal -- removal
of Hun Sen's government -- at least until elections were held,
and would replace his regime with an outside government that
would be virtually powerless to punish cease-fire violations.
Moreover, U.N. bureaucrats could serve as yet another foreign
enemy against which the xenophobic Khmer Rouge could rally
popular opinion. Hun Sen has predictably refused to dismantle
his government, which was installed by the Vietnamese army in
1979 to replace the genocidal Khmer Rouge.

    For their part, the Khmer Rouge and the other factions may
agree to elections as a tactical matter. But none of them have
ever participated in a fair election, and the Khmer Rouge, at
least, could never dream of winning one. For them, power can
come only from the barrel of a gun.

    3. Foreign patrons must pressure their Cambodian clients.
This may be the U.N. plan's best hope. Optimists believe Moscow
will lean on Hun Sen, and Beijing on the Khmer Rouge -- even
to the point of cutting off military aid. Severe economic
problems and the end of the cold war suggest that the optimists
may be right about Soviet intentions. But despite China's
agreement to the basic plan and certain vague "signals," it is
by no means clear that Beijing would pressure the Khmer Rouge
to capitulate. If it does not, more war is likely; if it does,
the Khmer Rouge, realizing that some other Asian countries feel
as strongly as China about ousting the pro-Vietnamese government
in Phnom Penh, could try to continue the war.

    4. The proposed cease-fire must last long enough for the
U.N.-supervised government to unpack its bags and organize
elections. In Indochina few cease-fires have lasted long enough
for the guns to cool. The U.N. plan calls for the four armies
to be corralled into "cantonment areas," where their weapons
would be stored under "U.N. supervision." Experience with the
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong during the Vietnam War and with
the Khmer Rouge over the past 20 years suggests that this is
a pipe dream. There are reports that the Khmer Rouge is already
developing jungle caches of weapons and personnel in
anticipation of a possible cease-fire.

    5. A new government must be elected, and the defeated
parties must agree to form a loyal opposition. In the 36-year
history of modern Cambodia, no government has ever been chosen
in a fair, contested election. Nor is there a democratic ideal
to which Cambodians might cling. Instead, the great national
myth is Angkor Wat and the all-powerful god-kings who ruled a
millennium ago. Does this mean Cambodia can never have fair
elections? No. Does it mean they are unlikely anytime soon?
Yes.

    6. Sihanouk must finally make up his mind. If there is one
man around whom a new government might be built, it is
Sihanouk. Now the various factions simply use him, or his name,
at their pleasure. Last June the Prince joined Hun Sen in a
call for a Supreme National Council along the lines Hun Sen
prefers. But it is unclear whether this was really a split with
his Khmer Rouge allies or a ploy aimed at persuading an
increasingly shaky U.S. Congress to continue providing nonlethal
aid to the noncommunist members of the rebel coalition.
Sihanouk is as hard to pin down as a ball of mercury. If he
began to lead again, he might make a difference. But he's 67
years old. The world will soon pass him by, if it has not
already. The odds are that he will let it pass.

    The Bush Administration and its bipartisan supporters in
Congress believe the civil war will be brought to an end only
through a "comprehensive" settlement that includes removal of
the nominally communist Hun Sen government. Others, like former
Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and Democratic Senator Robert
Kerrey, think the war could end through regular
government-to-government contact between Washington and Phnom
Penh and the lifting of the U.S.-led economic boycott of
Cambodia. The former vision may be grander; the latter has a
far better chance of success.